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THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
A MODEL FOR TITLE VII ENFORCEMENT
Stephen L. Mikochikt
We hear much today about family values - though much
that we hear is simply electioneering. Yet, even presidential
politics cannot obscure the fact that the American family is in
trouble; that trouble is made worse by the reluctance of busi-
ness to adapt personnel practices to the changing American
family.
Once, business capitalized on a division of labor that saw
wives maintain the home, freeing business to monopolize their
husbands' concerns. Now, with the vast influx of women work-
ers and the alarming rise in single-parent households, business
can no longer expect such fealty, but must at last confront
demands to treat workers as whole persons whose family com-
mitments sometimes require accommodation. A real respect for
family values would not leave these demands unmet; if we truly
valued families, we would insure that business actually respect-
ed its workers' family commitments.
Congress is considering family leave legislation during this
election year.' Rather than assessing the merits and political
prospects of such initiatives, I propose instead to pursue an
alternative route charted by way of existing law. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 19642 forbids sex discrimination in
employment and condemns the practices of the past that were
facially neutral, yet disparate in their effects upon women
workers.3 The denial of family leave arguably impacts women
workers more heavily than men, and thereby is open to Title
VII attack, provided we temper the broad deference typically
bestowed upon business discretion.
t Professor, Temple Law School. LL.M., Harvard Law School; J.D.,
Fordham Law School; B.A., New York University. I acknowledge the support
for this essay provided by Temple Law School, with special appreciation to
Bryan C. Schroll, Luna Y. Pattela, and Mary E. Porter.
1 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 816, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (to accompany
S. 5, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1992).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. II 1990)).
'See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (invalidating height
and weight requirements for Alabama state prison guard positions).
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A balanced approach is needed to reconcile both business'
and workers' particular needs. The Americans with Disabilities
Act4 (ADA) provides such balance on a grand scale. The ADA
requires employers to take reasonable affirmative steps to
accommodate the impairments of workers with disabilities -
the largest minority in America. If valuing each human person
requires business to take some account of the ways workers
with disabilities live their lives, then fairness and the indispens-
able human family demand a like concern for the family lives
that all workers live.
This article begins by considering the ADA and its proscrip-
tion of employment practices that, in effect, discriminate. Title
virs disparate impact analysis, which the Burger Court devel-
oped to address the artificial barriers that blocked minorities'
access to the labor force,5 foreshadowed the ADA's focus upon
proscribing discriminatory effect. The Rehnquist Court later
revised6 Title VII disparate impact analysis to better defend
employer prerogatives by approximating a test of intent.' The
Civil Rights Act of 19918 has rejected that revision, yet has
offered no real guidance in its place. This allows for the pros-
pect of more restrictive readings in the future. This article
concludes that the ADA, with its balanced concern for employers
and employees alike, can provide the needed guidance, if not for
all of Title VII's applications, at least for disparate impact
analysis and the issue of family leave.
4 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat.
327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. II 1990) and 47
U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (West 1991)).
' Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
6 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
1 Qf GERALD GUNTHER, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 708 n.10 (12th ed. 1991)
("The effect of Wards Cove was to narrow the gap between what is required to
make out a prima facie case of an equal protection violation and what is
necessary to make out a prima facie case of a statutory claim under Title
VII."); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ("[Tlhe basic equal
protection principle [is] that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose.").
' Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601 & 1201-1224, 29 U.S.C. § 626, & 42 U.S.C. § 1981
and scattered sections).
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The ADA forbids discrimination on the basis of disability in
the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.9 That
Congress intended the ADA to prohibit purposeful discrimina-
tion"° is not surprising given the grotesque treatment that
disabled people have at times endured." Most of the difficul-
ties that disabled people encounter, however, are not the prod-
uct of animus, but rather of neglect 12 - the thoughtless erec-
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individu-
al in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment."). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4
(1991).
'0 In passing the ADA, Congress found that "individuals with disabilities
are a discrete and insular minority who have been... subjected to a history
of purposeful unequal treatment," 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7), and that "the
continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice
denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis."
Id. § 12101(a)(9). See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8 (1989)
("Historically, individuals with disabilities have been isolated and subjected to
discrimination and such isolation and discrimination is still pervasive in our
society."); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 28-31 (1990); 135
CONG. REC. S10,708 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Harkin, Chair,
Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, and the Act's principal Senate sponsor). Cf School Bd. of Nassau
Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) ("[S]ociety's accumulated myths and
fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment." (footnote omitted)). The ADA
accordingly was passed "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
" See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 461-462
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he
mentally retarded have been subject to a 'lengthy and tragic history'. . . of
segregation and discrimination that can only be called grotesque .... A
regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation [of retarded per-
sons] ... emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed
paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow." (citations omitted)). See also
Arline, 480 U.S. at 278 n.2 (1987) ("'[Nlegative attitudes and practices toward
the disabled resemble those commonly attached to underprivileged ethnic and
religious minority groups.'" (quoting Jacobus TenBroek & Floyd W. Matson,
The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809, 814-15 (1966));
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 n.12 (1985) ("To be sure, well-cata-
loged instances of invidious discrimination against the handicapped do exist."
(citations omitted)).
' See Choate, 469 U.S. at 295 ("Discrimination against the handicapped
was perceived by Congress [in passing predecessor legislation] to be most often
1992]
28 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.2:25
tion of architectural, transportation, and communication barri-
ers that impede their access to virtually every aspect of public
life.'3 As the United States Supreme Court observed, legisla-
tion for disabled people would "ring hollow" if it "could not
rectify the harms resulting from action that discriminated by
effect as well as by design."'4
Consequently, Congress focused much of the ADA's atten-
tion on the adverse effects of employment decisions." The
ADA's provisions define forbidden discrimination to include the
use of "qualification standards, employment tests or other
selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an indi-
vidual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities
unless the standard, test or other selection criteria.., is shown
to be job-related[,... consistent with business necessity,"'6
and "such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accom-
modation .... "17
the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and
indifference - of benign neglect." (alteration added) (footnote omitted)). See
also S. REP. No. 116, supra note 10, at 6 ("Discrimination results from actions
or inactions that discriminate by effect as well as by intent or design"); H.R.
REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 10, at 29.
13 See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 10, at 6-15; H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2,
supra note 10, at 34-39; 135 CoNG. REc. S10,708 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989)
(remarks of Sen. Harkin); id. (remarks of Sen. Cranston, the principal Senate
sponsor of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 5-55
(1989) (statements of Rep. Tony Coelho, House majority whip and the Acts
principal House sponsor; Dr. I. King Jordan, President, Gallaudet University;
Justin Dart, Chair, Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans
with Disabilities; Mary DeSapio; Joseph F. Danowsky; Amy Dimsdale; Harold
Russell, Chair, President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabili-
ties; Zachary Fasman; Lawrence Z. Lorber; Arlene B. Mayerson).
14 Choate, 469 U.S. at 297 (footnote omitted).
15 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)-(3)(A) ("[T]he term 'discriminate'
includes - (1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee
in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or
employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee; (2) partici-
pating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the
effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a
disability to the discrimination prohibited by this [Act;] ... (3) utilizing
standards, criteria, or methods of administration - (A) that have the effect of
discrimination on the basis of disability.").
16 Id. § 12112(b)(6). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10 (1991).
17 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(1) (1991). The ADA
A MODEL FOR TITLE VII ENFORCEMENT
These provisions are not new. They track regulations
implementing § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,18 which
attempted to adapt "the principle [of disparate impact] estab-
lished under Title VII" to the circumstances of disability. 9
That principle was first articulated over two decades ago. Yet,
its enforcement in Title VII law is at a crossroad today as a
result of the Rehnquist Court's restrictive reading and Congress'
less than definitive response.
Title VII forbids employment practices that "deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportun-
ities... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. '"20 As first construed by the Supreme Court in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,"' this language revealed Congress'
intent to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers
to employment when the barriers operate[d] invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.""2 Griggs commanded that, in order to survive
does not define "qualification standards" comprehensively. Cf 42 U.S.C.
§ 12113(b) (including the absence of a "direct threat" as a permissible qualifi-
cation standard). But EEOC's enforcement regulations provide that the term
includes "the skill, experience, education, physical, medical, safety and other
requirements... which an individual must meet in order to be eligible for the
position held or desired." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q) (1991).
" See Dept. of Health and Human Services Employment Criteria Rule, 45
C.F.R. § 84.13(a) (1991) ("A recipient [of Federal financial assistance] may not
make use of any employment test or other selection criterion that screens out
or tends to screen out handicapped persons or any class of handicapped
persons unless: (1) the test score or other selection criterion, as used by the
recipient, is shown to be job-related for the position in question, and (2)
alternative job-related tests or criteria that do not screen out or tend to screen
out as many handicapped persons are not shown by the [funding
agency] ... to be available.").
'9 45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a). Portions of the ADA are substantially similar to
Title VII. For example, the ADA incorporates several key definitions found in
Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(7) ("The terms 'person,' 'labor organization,'
'employment agency,' 'commerce,' and 'industry affecting commerce' shall have
the same meaning given such terms in section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e)"). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(c). Additionally, the
ADA also adopts Title VII enforcement procedures. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)
("The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5,
2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies, and
procedures... [the employment title of the Act] provides.").
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
21 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22Id. at 431.
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judicial scrutiny, an employer engaging in a neutral employ-
ment practice that had the negative effect of depriving an
individual of equal opportunities based on race or sex (as evi-
denced by its substantially disparate effect on minorities or
women), must also show that the employment practice had a
positive effect, by demonstrating that it had "a manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question."23
During the 1970s, the Court revisited Griggs in a series of
cases - including Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,' Washington
v. Davis,25 and Dothard v. Rawlinson28 - so that, by 1982,
the Court had developed some structure for disparate impact
analysis:
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a
plaintiff... [must] show that the facially neutral em-
ployment practice had a significantly discriminatory
impact .... [Tihe employer then... [was obliged to]
demonstrate that any given requirement [had] a mani-
fest relationship to the employment in ques-
tion .... Even in such a case, however, the plain-
tiff... [might] prevail, if he show[ed] that the employ-
er was using the practice as a mere pretext for discrimina-
tion.27
By 1989, with its personnel changing, the Court had begun
to enforce this structure more leniently, fearing that strict
23 Id. at 432.
24 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (Employment tests with substantially disparate
effects "are impermissible unless shown, by professionally acceptable methods,
to be 'predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work
behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates
are being evaluated.'" (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c))).
2 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (applying Title VII principles to D.C. Code § 1-320
(1973)).
26 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) ("If the employer proves that the challenged
requirements are job related, the plaintiff may then show that other selection
devices without a similar discriminatory effect would also 'serve the employer's
legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy workmanship."' (quoting
Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425, quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 801 (1973)) (further internal quotations omitted).
' Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,446-47 (1982) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
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enforcement would encourage employers to resort to quota
hiring.' Thus, according to Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio,29 once plaintiff established a prima facie case, "the
employer carrie[d] the burden of producing evidence of a busi-
ness justification for his employment practice. The burden of
persuasion, however, remain[ed] with the disparate-impact
plaintiff."3" Though plaintiff could continue to prove pretext by
showing that "'other tests or selection devices, without a similar-
ly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's
legitimate [hiring] interest[s],"'" 1 such practices "must be [as]
equally effective as... [the employer's] chosen hiring proce-
dures .... Factors such as the cost or other burdens of pro-
posed alternative selection devices are relevant in determining
whether they would be equally as effective."'3 2
Griggs itself made this turnabout possible through its
ambivalence regarding the nature of disparate impact analysis.
In one view, the thrust of Griggs is captured in Chief Justice
Burger's assertion that "[w]hat Congress has commanded is that
any tests used must measure the person for the job and not the
person in the abstract."" This interpretation emphasizes "the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment... .'34
Concern for the employer's needs dominates this view.3"
s See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. 642, 652 ("The only practicable option for
many employers [to avoid costly validation studies of practices with a dispa-
rate effect] would be to adopt racial quotas.").
29 Id.
30 Id. at 659.
I11d. at 660 (quoting Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425).
Id. at 661 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,
998 (1988) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, and Scalia, JJ.)).
3 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
4 Id. at 431. The Court did not explicate its analysis further since the
challenged criteria, which were adopted to "improve the overall quality
of... [defendant's] work force" and "without meaningful study of their
relationship to job-performance ability," fell without more.
' See Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97
HARV. L. REV. 997, 1005 (1984) [hereinafter "Employment Discrimination
Against the Handicapped"] ("[Allthough courts... have understood nondis-
crimination to require selection based upon merit, they have meant by 'merit'
not 'general excellence,' but rather the 'possession of precisely those qualities
of excellence needed to perform a functionally defined task.' The equal
1992]
32 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol.2:25
Deference is paid to how employers structure their businesses
with judicial oversight narrowly limited to insuring that practic-
es which screen out minorities and women actually are job-
related."6 As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in
a Title VII case, "Congress was concerned about preserving
employer freedom, and ... it acted to mandate color-blindness
with as little intrusion into the free enterprise system as possi-
ble." This view of Griggs places little burden on employers to
avoid the harm occasioned by the disparate effects of their job-
related practices.
Yet, Griggs can also be read more broadly to require that
employers take steps to mitigate harm. Chief Justice Burger
further observed that:
[Tiests or criteria for employment or promotion may not
provide equality of opportunity merely in the sense of
the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On the
contrary, Congress has now required that the posture
and condition of the job-seeker be taken into account.
It has.., provided that the vessel in which the milk is
proffered be one all seekers can use . . . [Title VIII
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also prac-
tices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in opera-
tion. The touchstone is business necessity.3"
treatment model accordingly is satisfied when employers treat each employee
or prospective employee as a vehicle for performing tasks and maximizing
profits. Hence the traditional paradigm of discrimination implicitly adopts the
view that employment should be regarded as a means to employer-defined
ends in a competitive market rather than as an end in itself." (footnotes
omitted)).
36Id. at 1004-05. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
3' Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1278 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. den., 455 U.S. 1021 (1982) (quoted in Employment Discrimination Against
the Handicapped, supra note 35, at 1005 n.48). See McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) ("The broad, overriding interest, shared by
employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship
assured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel deci-
sions." (quoted in Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped, supra
note 35)).
38 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (For example, "whether testing requirements
that take into account capability for the next succeeding position or a related
future promotion.. . fulfill a genuine business need" was a question raised
but not reached in Griggs. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 433-34 ("In
Griggs... the Court left [that question] open.")).
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In recasting that touchstone as "a reasoned review of the
employer's justification,"39 the Court in Wards Cove rejected
the broader view of Griggs and, with it, any "requirement that
the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the emplo-
yer's business."4 Congress, however, set Wards Cove aside in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,41 but failed to provide a clear
substitute in its place. Though the Act undoubtedly imposed
upon employers the burden of persuasion in rebutting a prima
facie case of disparate impact42 (to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged practice was 'job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity"),' it construed that burden
(along with plaintff's burden of proving pretext through demon-
strating the availability of alternative employment practices)44
by referring exclusively to Griggs and its pre-Wards Cove
39 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
401d.
41 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(2), 105 Stat. 1071
("T]he decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove ... has weakened the
scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections"); id. § 3(2) ("The
purposes of this Act are ... to codify the concepts of 'business necessity' and
Job-related' enunciated... in Griggs... and in the other Supreme Court
decisions prior to Wards Cove.").
' See id. § 104(m) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m)) C[T]he term 'demon-
strates' means meets the burden of production and persuasion."); id. § 105(a)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)) ("An unlawful employment practice
based on disparate impact is established under this title only if... a com-
plaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment
practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity...").
43 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(a) (as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)C1)(A)(i)).
" See id. (as codified at § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)) ("An unlawful employment
practice based on disparate impact is established under this title only
if... the complaining party makes the demonstration.., with respect to an
alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to adopt such
alternative employment practice.").
19921
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progeny.45 To contend that those cases provide clear guidance
is regrettably optimistic.46
Given the politically charged legislation involved, that
Congress sidestepped this issue is not surprising. However, the
unavoidable result is that restrictive readings are still possible,
unless Congress satisfied the concerns voiced by the Court in
Wards Cove. That Court had cautioned against imposing
burdens "almost impossible for most employers to
meet... [that] would result in a host of evils[, including quota
hiring.]"4 7
The standard Congress set forth in the ADA, however,
addresses these concerns. On the one hand, that standard
obliges employers to take into account "the posture and condi-
tion"4 of the nation's "largest minority";49 on the other hand,
" See id. § 105(b) ("No statements other than the interpretative memoran-
dum appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional Record S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25,
1991) shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in any way as
legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that
relates to Wards Cove - Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business
practice."); 137 CONG. REC. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (interpretative
memorandum) ("[T]he exclusive legislative history is as follows: The terms
'business necessity' and 'job related' are intended to reflect the concepts
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs... and in the other Supreme
Court decisions prior to Wards Cove."). See also Civil Rights Act of 1991
§ 105(a)(1)(C) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C)) (Plaintiffs demonstra-
tion of an alternative employment practice "shall be in accordance with the
law as it existed on June 4, 1989 [the day prior to Wards Cove], with respect
to the concept of 'alternative employment practice."'). This approved history
nowhere refers to the ADA passed only one year earlier.
46 Compare Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) with Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., White, and Scalia, JJ.) (concerning the applicability of the EEOC
Guidelines' "four-fifths rule" in determining the degree of disproportionality
needed to make out a prima facie case); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975) with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (concerning
whether training program success validation rather than job success validation
is sufficient to satisfy the 'Job-related" requirement); Watson, 487 U.S. 977
(O'Connor, J.) with id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (concerning whether formal validation is required for subjective
criteria with disparate impact); Albemarle, 422 U.S. 405 with Watson, 487 U.S.
977 (O'Connor, J.) (no definitive guidance on when alternative practices with
less disparate impact are sufficiently available to constitute pretext if not
adopted).
4 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
4 See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 10, at 9 (statement of then Vice Presi-
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it frees employers when that duty unduly trammels their
particular needs. The ADA and its balanced approach to em-
ployers and employees alike thereby can help guide future
disparate impact analysis under Title VII.
Simply put, the ADA directs that employment practices
involving a disparate effect must be essential for the job in
question. Specifically, selection criteria that screen out disabled
workers not only must be 'job-related," but also "consistent with
business necessity."50 Although the ADA provides no express
definition, "business necessity" corresponds to the term "essen-
tial functions" of the job in question5 ' - "job tasks that are
fundamental and not marginal" 2 - that disabled individuals
must meet to be qualified under the ADA.53 Thus, only chal-
dent Bush); 135 CoNG. REC. S10,708 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of
Sen. Harkin); id. at E1575 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Rep. Coelho).
50 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.10. See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12113(a) ("It may be a defense... that an alleged application of qualification
standards, tests, or selection criteria... has been shown to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity."); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(1).
5' See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 10, at 26 ("In determining what consti-
tutes the essential functions of the job, consideration should be given to the
employer's judgment regarding what functions are essential as a matter of
business necessity."); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 10, at 55; 136 CONG.
REC. H2,315 (daily ed. May 15, 1990) (statement of Rep. DeLay); 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,749 (1991) (Interpretative Guidelines) ("Selection criteria
that exclude, or tend to exclude, an individual with a disability or a class of
individuals with disabilities because of their disability but do not concern an
essential function of the job would not be consistent with business necessity.").
5 S. REP. No. 116, supra note 10, at 26. See H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2,
supra note 10, at 55; 136 CoNG. REC. H2,599 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (state-
ment of Rep. Fish); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (1991) ("The term 'essential
functions' means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the
individual with a disability holds or desires. The term 'essential functions'
does not include the marginal functions of the position.").
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) ("The term 'qualified individual with a disa-
bility' means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires."). Cf 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m)
("'Qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a disability
who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related
requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires, and
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
fimctions of such position."). The quoted regulation distinguishes between
fimctions of the employment position and requisite job-related requirements,
perhaps implying that "essential" as a standard for "business necessity"
applies in only the former case. But see 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, 56 Fed. Reg. 35749
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lenged practices that relate to job essentials will survive the
ADA's scrutiny.
Congress placed upon employers the burden of showing
relation to job essentials as a defense to plaintiffs' claims,54
though scope of the burden was not resolved definitively when
the ADA was passed.5 However, courts likely will construe
that burden as one of persuasion, especially given the related amend-
ment of Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.5"
In that regard, the employer's judgment about which func-
tions of a job are essential, though plainly relevant, 7 is not
controlling." The ADA requires a balanced review of the
employee's abilities and the employer's needs59 - the central
question is whether the employer would be harmed unreason-
ably if the disabled worker did not perform the function in
(1991) (Interpretative Guidelines). But these categories are not materially
different. Skill, experience, education, and the like are used to predict future
functioning by estimating present ability. As selection criteria, they can
likewise screen out workers on the basis of disability (for example, skills not
acquired or education denied because of a disabling condition). They accord-
ingly warrant no less scrutiny than afforded functional criteria.
' See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a); S. REP. No. 116, supra note 10, at 40; H.R.
REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 10, at 76; 136 CONG. REC. H2421 (daily ed.
May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Levine); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(1).
6 See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 10, at 38 ("The Committee [on Labor
and Human Resources] intends that the burden of proof... be construed in
the same manner in which parallel agency provisions are construed under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as of June 4, 1989 [the day before Wards
Cove was rendered]. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.13... ."); H.R. REP. No. 485, pt.
2, supra note 10, at 71; 45 C.F.R. app. pt. 84 at 382 (Section 84.13 "is an
application of the principle established under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 in Griggs.").
56 See supra note 42.
5 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) ("[Clonsideration shall be given to the
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the
essential functions of the job."); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i) & (ii).
58 See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, 33 (1990) (stating
that the House Committee on the Judiciary specifically rejected an amend-
ment that would have created a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
employer's judgment concerning what functions are essential).
59 See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 10, at 26; H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2,
supra note 10, at 55; 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,749 (1991) (Interpre-
tative Guidelines). See also Strathie v. Dept. of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 232
(3rd Cir. 1983).
A MODEL FOR TrrLE VII ENFORCEMENT
question - of necessity, a case-by-case review of diverse fac-
tors.6 0
The ADA, however, requires employers to consider accom-
modations 61 that may permit the employee to perform satisfac-
torily, even when a court finds a function is essential to the
job.62 The ADA fails to specify who has the initial burden of
identifying whether such accommodations exist.63 However,
case law under the Rehabilitation Act requires plaintiffs, with
their superior knowledge of what adjustments they may need, to
make out "a facial showing or at least plausible reasons to
believe that the handicap can be accommodated";' Congress
intended that burdens of proof under the ADA be consistent
with those under the Rehabilitation Act.
In contrast, that employers have the burden of persuasion
that possible accommodations are unacceptable is hardly doubt-
ed.66 To succeed, they must show that the accommodation at
' Such factors include (1) whether "the reason the position exists is to
perform that fumction," 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i); (2) whether there is a
"limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that
job function can be distributed," id. at § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii); and (3) whether the
function is "highly specialized so that the incumbent ... is hired for [that]
expertise or ability," id. at § 1630.2(n)(2)(iii); with consideration given, inter
alia, to (1) "[t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function," id.
at § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii); (2) "[the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to
perform the function," id. at § 1630.2(n)(3)(iv); and (3) "the terms of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement," id. at § 1630.2(n)(3)(v).
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (Supp. H 1990) (including, for example, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, removal of architectural barriers, allowance of part-time
or modified work schedules, or other adjustments or modifications of policies);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9.
' Qf S. REP. No. 116, supra note 10, at 33-34; H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2,
supra note 10, at 64-65.
" Prewit v. U.S. Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 310 (5th Cir. 1981).
6 See S. REP. NO. 116, supra note 10, at 38; H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2,
supra note 10, at 71.
' See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. 111990) ("[T]he term 'discriminate'
includes - not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who
is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business of [such employer]"); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a). Cf Prewit, 662 F.2d at
308-309.
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issue would impose an "undue hardship,""s defined as "requir-
ing significant difficulty or expense."'  This limits business
discretion far more than the equivalence required of less oner-
ous alternatives in Wards Cove,69 since under the ADA the
employer's duty to accommodate is not meant to guard against
employer pretext but to require reasonable mitigation of exclusi-
onary effects.
70
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. II 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9.
6 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). See 29 C.F.R. § 16 3 0. 2 (p)(1). The factors
considered in determining "undue hardship" are as follows:
(i) The nature and net cost of the accommodation needed under this
part, taking into consideration the availability of tax credits and
deductions, and/or outside funding;,
(ii) The overall financial resources of the facility or facilities in-
volved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation, the
number of persons employed at such facility, and the effect on
expenses and resources;
(iii) The overall financial resources of the covered entity, the overall
size of the business of the covered entity with respect to the number
of its employees, and the number, type and location of its facilities;
(iv) The type of operation or operations of the covered entity,
including the composition, structure and functions of the work force
of such entity, and the geographic separateness and administrative
or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the
covered entity; and
(v) The impact of the accommodation upon the operation of the
facility, including the impact on the ability of other employees to
perform their duties and the impact on the facility's ability to
conduct business.
Id. at § 1630.2(p)(2). See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B).
69 See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see also
discussion supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
70 Compare S. REP. No. 116, supra note 10, at 35 ("In situations where
there are two effective accommodations, the employer may choose the accom-
modation that is less expensive or easier for the employer to implement as
long as the selected accommodation provides meaningful equal employment
opportunity ([defined as] an opportunity to attain the same level of perfor-
mance as is available to non-disabled employees having similar skills and
abilities). The expressed choice of the applicant or employee shall be given
primary consideration unless another effective accommodation exists that
would provide a meaningful equal employment opportunity or that the
accommodation requested would pose an undue hardship.") with Ansonia Bd.
of Ed. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) (holding that an employer satisfies the
duty to accommodate its employee's religious beliefs under Title VII by
providing any reasonable accommodation (that would not impose "undue
hardship"), and is not required to adopt the most reasonable accommodation
or the one proposed by its employee).
A MODEL FOR TITLE VII ENFORCEMENT
Job requirements specifying functional abilities technically
discriminate intentionally on the basis of disability, although
not necessarily in an invidious way. In that regard, they corre-
spond to the intentional use of religion, sex, or national origin
as employment criteria, permitted under Title VII "in those
certain instances where... [their use] is a bona fide occupation-
al qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
[the] particular business."'" The United States Supreme
Court's narrow construction of that exception 2 raises a basic
question about the utility of the ADA as a model for Title VII
enforcement. As Justice Brennan once remarked, "what differ-
entiates sex from ... intelligence or physical disability ... is
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability
to perform.""3
In contrast to sex characteristics themselves, choices that
women are more likely to make with respect to child or parental
care may well hinder their ability to perform in a work milieu
still dominated by male norms. Yet the fairness that requires
employers reasonably to accommodate the needs of their dis-
abled employees, by "permitting the use of accrued paid leave or
providing additional unpaid leave for necessary treatment,"7 4
or by permitting part-time or modified work schedules, 75 also
should direct attention to the "posture and condition" of women
workers when inflexible family leave policies have a needless
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
72See UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1206 (1991) ("[Tlhe safety
exception [part of the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense] is
limited to instances in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the
employee's ability to perform the job [which was not the case with defendant's
fetal protection policy]. This approach is consistent with the language of the
BFOQ provision itself, for it suggests that permissible distinctions based on
sex must relate to ability to perform the duties of the job."). Fetal protection
policies, as they involve questions of disability (protecting fetuses from
disabling conditions) and procreative decision-making, raise issues of "deep
social concern," id., not only because they affect women workers but also
because they involve attitudes toward the value placed on disabled life.
" Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion). Cf
School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (Brennan, J.)
("[Slociety's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as
handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impair-
ment." (footnote omitted)).
7' 29 C.F.R. app. pt. § 1630, 56 Fed. Reg. 35744 (1991) (Interpretative
Guidelines).
75 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o).
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disparate impact. 6 Any resulting changes inevitably would
apply to male and female workers alike - fostering more
equitable sharing of family responsibilities and furthering an
ideal, with which I agree, that the fundamental purpose of
economic life is not profit or domination, but service of the
human person, and indeed the whole person."
76 Compare id. ([I]t is not the intent of this part to second guess an
employer's business judgment with regard to production standards.") with
EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th
Cir. 1988) (rejecting a sex discrimination claim against Sears' commission
sales structure).
71 THE DocUMENTs OF THE VATicAN 1 273 (W. Abbott ed., 1966).
